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Abstract
This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a set-
ting in which private agents receive noisy signals about future shocks to
government expenditures. We show how to empirically identify the rela-
tive weight of news and noise shocks to government spending and com-
pute the level of noise for Canada, the UK and the US. We then investigate
the quantitative implications of imperfect fiscal policy information using
a medium-scale DSGE model. We find that when the government seeks
to implement a persistent change in expected public spending, the exis-
tence of noise (as estimated using actual data) implies a sizable difference
in fiscal multipliers compared to the perfect fiscal foresight case.
Keywords: Government spending, Noisy Information, DSGE Models
1. Introduction
A recent stream of literature has investigated the role of foresight in fis-
cal policy, which implies that the implementation of fiscal policy measures
is lagged with respect to their announcement (see, e.g., Leeper, Walker,
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and Yang, 2013). This literature is concerned with the macroeconomic ef-
fects implied by the presence of fiscal policy news. For example, Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Born, Peter, and
Pfeifer (2013) find that news shocks explain a major portion of govern-
ment spending fluctuations. Moreover, these studies find that news on
government spending propagates significantly through the real economy:
if one abstracts from other sources of aggregate fluctuations and consid-
ers government spending shocks in isolation, the expected components
of government policies (i.e., news shocks) account for between 40% and
100% of the variance of GDP, and the remaining variance is attributable to
unexpected government spending shocks.
News shocks are introduced in this literature by assuming that agents
have perfect foresight about the size and the timing of future policy. How-
ever, recent influential contributions in macroeconomics have highlighted
the role of imperfect information in business cycles. In particular, such
findings are found in Lorenzoni (2009), which shows that imperfect infor-
mation about aggregate productivity is a key source of cyclical fluctuation.
Given the considerable uncertainty surrounding the implementation of
fiscal policy, it seems natural to extend the setup to imperfect information
about news to the case of government spending. In this paper, we thus fo-
cus on the macroeconomic effects of noisy fiscal policy announcements. By
noisy announcements, we mean the following: A policymaker announces
a fiscal policy measure at a particular point in time that is supposed to
come into effect at a future date, while private agents in the economy be-
lieve that the announcement may not be fully implemented. Partial im-
plementation may be due to amendments that occur during the legislative
process or to incomplete information about future states of the economy.
As a consequence, the information structure we examine is different from
previous papers in which future fiscal policy is fully predictable.
Thus, the main contribution of this paper is twofold: i) we quantify
the size of noisy news using data from both forecasts and realizations of
government spending; ii) we assess the effect of noise and its propaga-
tion through the economy using a medium-scale DSGE model with real
frictions.
The main result of this paper is that a “noisy” announcement leads to
an under-reaction of macroeconomic variables to the announcement itself.
The values of the fiscal multipliers drastically fall compared to the full in-
formation case. We make use of the official government spending forecasts
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from the annual budgets of three countries (Canada, the United Kingdom
and the United States) for which we were able to obtain enough informa-
tion. We find that the amount of noise observed for these three countries is
rather significant: the share of noise in these official government spending
forecasts ranges from 28% in the US to 84% in the UK. When embedding
these estimates into a full-fledged DSGE model, we find that in a “noisy”
scenario, before news events are realized, the value of government spend-
ing multipliers, compared to the full information case, falls proportion-
ally to the level of noise. Additionally, the effect of noise does not vanish
with the occurrence of the fiscal shock. For example, in the UK, for which
the relevance of noise is most compelling, we obtain a loss in the output
multiplier of approximately 10% one year after the materialization of the
news compared to the perfect information case. Such an effect is more
pronounced for investment, even in economies in which the role of noise
is limited; for example, for the US, which is the country with the lowest
share of noise among those considered, we find that the loss in the invest-
ment multiplier one year after the realization of a news event remains at
approximately 12%, a non-negligible figure.
Our work can thus be seen as an attempt to connect several bodies of
literature. First, our paper is an extension of the literature on fiscal fore-
sight. Notably, papers such as Ramey (2011) and Leeper, Walker, and Yang
(2013) show the relevance of fiscal foresight and the perils econometricians
face from ignoring it.1 Such findings have been recently reinforced by
Born, Peter, and Pfeifer (2013), which shows that all of the output variance
generated by fiscal policies arises from news about government spending.
We show that when imperfect information is included, the effects of fiscal
foresight are drastically reduced.2
Other studies (Ellahie and Ricco, 2014; Ricco, 2014) introduce informa-
1An earlier attempt to introduce anticipated fiscal policy in an SVAR framework can
be found in Tenhofen and Wolff (2007).
2A slightly different approach is pursued in Hollmayr and Matthes (2015), wherein
uncertainty stems from the fact that agents learn whether shocks are temporary or perma-
nent over time. This, of course, leads to an increase in the volatility of the macro variables
over the short run compared with the case in which agents perfectly know the nature of
the shock that is affecting the economy. A similar result can be found in our paper when
the economy experiences a permanent fiscal shock. For a model of fiscal consolidation in
which agents need to learn whether restrictive fiscal shocks are temporary or permanent
over time, see Lemoine and Linde´ (2015).
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tional frictions in SVAR models, although no microfoundations for such
frictions are provided. In particular, Ricco (2014) introduces a shock to
agents’ expectations, a so-called “misexpectation shock”, into a rather stan-
dard fiscal VAR model. Such a shock is aimed at capturing “the differences
between the agents’ expectations about the current state of the economy
and the ex-post revealed value of macroeconomic variables” (Ricco 2014,
p.4). This shock is due to information frictions. The author finds that
macroeconomic variables react to such shocks, albeit more moderately
than to fundamental fiscal shocks. In our paper, we recover similar find-
ings and provide a structural interpretation of agents’ misexpectations.
Our approach is also partly related to a set of papers on fiscal policy
uncertainty. One of these papers recently revived interest in fiscal uncer-
tainty, Bloom, Baker, and Davis (2013), which empirically demonstrates
the detrimental effects of fiscal uncertainty on macroeconomic variables.
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011) instead develops a model in which the
volatility of fiscal policy is assumed to be changing over time. Such a fea-
ture of fiscal policy leads to an increase in uncertainty and implies detri-
mental effects on both output and consumption. When monetary policy is
stuck at the zero lower bound, such effects are reinforced. These findings
are also shown in a New Keynesian model by Johannsen (2014). There are,
however, three main differences between this strand of literature and our
approach. First, from a methodological point of view, we provide a struc-
tural interpretation of fiscal uncertainty (i.e., for the lack of full informa-
tion), whereas in the above-mentioned papers, uncertainty is modeled as
an exogenous time variation in the volatility of model disturbances. Sec-
ond, we focus on government spending rather than on taxes because in-
troducing (distortionary) taxes would make our arguments slightly more
opaque and because of the lower comparability of tax schedules across
countries.3 Third, the detrimental effects of uncertainty obtained in the
above-mentioned papers are mainly related to precautionary savings mo-
tives that arise from the time-varying nature of the shocks’ volatility. In the
current paper, we instead focus on the first-order effects of uncertainty.
The idea that noise pollutes the impact of news shocks is not new in
3In an extension of our model (available upon request) with distortionary taxes on
capital, we show that an announced increase in taxes on capital negatively affects both
output and consumption. However, contrary to Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011), the
lack of information on news shocks in our model mitigates this negative effect.
4
macroeconomics. Indeed, a recent stream of literature has highlighted the
problems with the identification of these two shocks, although the focus
of this literature is on TFP shocks (Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni,
2013; Barsky and Sims, 2012 and Forni et al., 2014). With respect to this
literature, our contribution is related not only to the introduction of noise
in government spending but also to the identification procedure, which
relies on the comparison of forecasts and realizations of the government
spending process.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the quantita-
tive model and highlight its key items. In Section 3, we introduce our em-
pirical methodology, while in Section 4, we estimate the amount of news
and noise in the data. In Section 5, the results of the quantitative exercise
are shown and discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
To investigate the quantitative properties of noisy fiscal policy we rely
on a model with real frictions, along the lines of Mertens and Ravn (2011)
and Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe´, and Uribe (2012). The main features of the
model are described in the following sections.
2.1. Household and firm
There is a representative household maximizing
Eˆ0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
m1−σt
1− σ − ω
n1+κt
1 + κ
z1−σt
]
,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, σ > 0 is a parameter governing the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( 1
σ
), ω > 0 is a scale parameter, and
κ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The variable zt is an exogenous, deterministic process representing a
labor augmenting technology that evolves according to
zt = γzzt−1.
The variable nt represents hours worked, while mt is a composite good
made of both durable and nondurable goods
mt = c
ν
t v
1−ν
t − bcνt−1v1−νt−1 ,
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where ct and vt are non-durable and durable goods, respectively, and ν ∈
[0, 1] is a share parameter.
In each period the household budget constraint writes
ct + xt + dt = wtnt + rtutkt + Tt,
where xt and dt are new purchases of capital and of durable goods, re-
spectively.4 Real wages are denoted wt, returns on capital rt and capital
utilization ut. Taxes Tt are levied in a lump-sum fashion. The respective
laws of motion of capital and of durable goods are given by
kt+1 = [1− δk −Ψk (ut)] kt + xt
[
1− Φk
(
xt
xt−1
)]
and
vt+1 = (1− δv) vt + dt
[
1− Φv
(
dt
dt−1
)]
.
We assume that Φk, Φv and Ψ are zero at the non-stochastic steady state
and that Φ′k, Φ′v, Φ′′k, Φ′′v and Ψ′ are greater than or equal to zero.5
The firm maximizes its profits under a standard Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function
max
nt,kt
yt − wtnt − rtutkt
s.t. yt = a (utkt)
θ (ztnt)
1−θ .
Given that the focus of this paper is on government spending shocks, we
keep – without loss of generality – TFP, denoted a, fixed.
2.2. Government sector
The government budget is assumed to be balanced (i.e., Tt = gt), with
a government spending process that is exogenous and driven by news.6
4In our model, durable goods do not play a specific role. We introduce them to keep
our model as in line as possible with Mertens and Ravn (2011) and Chahrour, Schmitt-
Grohe´, and Uribe (2012).
5The functional forms we choose are Φk = ωi2 γ
2
z
(
xt
xt−1
− 1
)2
, Φd = ωd2 γ
2
z
(
dt
dt−1
− 1
)2
,
and Ψ = ψ1 (νt − 1) + ψ22 (νt − 1)2.
6As Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup, one could also introduce government
debt, with the results being unaffected.
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The process can be then written (in log-deviations from the steady state)
as
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + εt−q εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε), (1)
where |ρ| ≤ 1, and εt is a white noise shock to government spending with
mean zero and variance equal to σ2ε . The exogenous fiscal policy shock is
a news shock that appears with a lag equal to q periods.
Notice that government spending is modeled as a rather persistent
AR(1) process. This modeling choice replicates the findings of several esti-
mated DSGE models, where the autoregressive parameter for government
spending found is very close to unity (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007),
Mertens and Ravn (2011), Khan and Tsoukalas (2012) and Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2012)), and is reinforced by the findings discussed in Section 3.
For sake of simplicity, we focus here on the case with a single news
shock to government spending. More general representations (including
multiple news shocks) are discussed in Leeper et al. (2013) and Beaudry
and Portier (2014).7
Let us assume for simplicity that q = 1. Then, the timing of the shock is
such that the new policy is known one period in advance. Such timing is
used to illustrate the presence of noisy news. We will relax this assumption
later by considering longer lags in the announced government spending
policy and a more complex information structure. The new government
policy expected in period t+ 1 is then given by
Eˆtĝt+1 = ρĝt + Eˆtεt.
If the change in government spending is perfectly anticipated by private
agents, this equation reduces to
Eˆtĝt+1 = ρĝt + εt ≡ ĝt+1.
Thus, the expected change in government policy, represented by a news
shock, is perfectly forecasted by private agents, i.e., they know the new
government policy in advance. Here, we depart from this setup by as-
suming that private agents observe a noisy signal of εt (i.e., noisy news
about government spending) from
st = εt + νt, (2)
7See also, the discussion about identification with multiple news events in the next
section.
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where νt represents a noise shock. This variable is assumed to be a zero
mean white noise with variance σ2ν , and it is uncorrelated with εt for any
time index. If the endogenous variables of the model react to noise, then
the economy displays sunspot-like fluctuations, as it is affected by shocks
that are unrelated to fundamentals. This noise shock is of central interest
in the following sections. It represents how the private sector anticipates
the way that government policy is conducted.
Such noise is meant to capture the complex political process that leads
to policy changes, as well as political economy considerations. For exam-
ple, such a setting could capture a situation wherein a policymaker an-
nounces measures that can be partially eliminated during the legislative
process (for example, because of a different majority in parliament).
If the volatility of νt is negligible with respect to εt, private agents
would react immediately to news in the government policy. In this case,
the private sector perfectly foresees how an announced government spend-
ing policy will be conducted. If the signal is noisy, this is no longer the
case. Indeed, expectations of the new policy are corrupted because pri-
vate agents do not react perfectly to the announcement about government
spending in such an environment.
In this imperfect information case, the conditional expectations of pri-
vate agents are given by
Eˆtεt = αst ≡ α (εt + νt) ,
where the parameter α is obtained from a linear projection of εt on st (see
Hamilton 1994a)
α =
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
ν
.
When information is perfectly transmitted to private agents in the econ-
omy (α = 1 and σν = 0), they fully incorporate the announced government
policy in the next period, so they can immediately adjust their consump-
tion and labor supply decisions to the new economic conditions. Con-
versely, when the announced policy is completely noisy (σε/σν → 0 and
α→ 0), they will not react, as their expectations are insensitive to the new
policy.
Before calibrating and solving the model, we describe the methodology
used to extract both news and noise from the data, we then discuss the
results of our estimation.
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3. Identifying news and noise from government spending forecasts
In this section, we will discuss our empirical methodology for recov-
ering the relative contributions of news and noise using both realizations
and expectations of government spending. Instead of using a full informa-
tion estimation technique that requires us to solve and estimate a DSGE
model with noisy news shocks and other disturbances, we propose a sim-
ple limited information approach that only exploits data for actual realiza-
tions and forecasts of government spending. In addition to its simplicity,
an advantage of this procedure is that the estimation does not depend on
the specification of the whole DSGE model. As most of the data we con-
sider are available at an annual frequency, we will also propose a method
to recover the parameters at a quarterly frequency.
3.1. Methodology
The methodology we rely on for recovering α is an application of the
method of moments, with targeted moments being derived by comparing
the agents’ forecasts and actual government spending.
To start, assume that government spending obeys process (1) with q ≥
1. Also suppose that agents observe ĝt and a signal as in (2) from which
they infer the value of εt. Regardless of the value of q, the econometrician
has enough information to estimate ρ and σ2ε from the observation of ĝt.
Additionally, the agents’ forecasts will be
Eˆtĝt+1 = ρĝt + Eˆt [εt−q+1|St] ≡ ρĝt + αst−q+1,
where
α =
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
ν
and
St = {st, st−1,...} .
We can then make use of these forecasts to estimate the variance of noise
by computing the one-period-ahead forecast net of the autoregressive com-
ponent
Eˆtĝt+1 − ρĝt = α (εt−q+1 + νt−q+1) (3)
and then taking the variance of such an object
V1 ≡ V
(
Eˆtĝt+1 − ρĝt
)
= α2
(
σ2ε + σ
2
ν
)
=
σ4ε
σ2ε + σ
2
ν
(4)
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from which we derive σ2ν
σ2ν =
σ2ε (σ
2
ε − V1)
V1
.
From the inspection of (4), notice that σ2ε > V1. Note that this moment does
not depend on the lag q of the announcement: this property allows us to
recover α.8 Once we have α and εt, we can directly recover the noise νt
from (3).
An equivalent way to estimate α relies on performing a linear projec-
tion of the forecast error in (3) on the realization of the shock ĝt+1 − ρĝt =
εt−q+1
Cov (εt, αst)
V ar(εt)
= α,
where the residual of this OLS regression of αst over εt is equal to ανt, so
the time series of νt is also easily recovered. An interesting observation
comes from the fact that the R2 of the regression is equal to α. This means
that when the signal is not very noisy (i.e., σν → 0), a good inference can
be made concerning the fundamentals of the economy. However, when
the signal is extremely noisy (i.e., σν →∞), no inference can be made.
3.2. Discussion
Two remarks on the suggested methodology are in order. First, note
that the above identification strategy crucially relies on the fact that the in-
formation set of the agents and that of the econometrician do not coincide.
On the one hand, the econometrician does not directly observe the signal
and therefore has to recover it indirectly from agents’ expectations. On the
other hand, the econometrician observes the future realizations from the
actual government spending process, which are unknown data when the
agents produce their forecasts. Hence, by comparing the outcome with the
agents’ forecasts, the econometrician is able to recover α.
Second, note that the estimation procedure for α can be polluted by
model misspecification. We discuss three types of misspecification in the
following paragraphs.
8We acknowledge, however, that this is not a general result. This property is obtained
here because we consider a single news shock. With multiple news shocks and signals,
the estimated α is polluted by the signals. See the discussion below.
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Expected and unexpected fiscal shocks. A first type of misspecification may
arise if the true government spending process includes an expected and
an unexpected component
ĝt = ρĝt−1 + t−q + ηt,
with ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η). We will prove that ignoring the unexpected component
of government spending leads to estimating an upper (lower) bound for
the role of noise (news).
Suppose that the econometrician mistakenly ignores ηt and instead
tries to estimate the model as in (1): she will then mistakenly treat the
two shocks ηt + εt−q as a single shock (denoted wt). The variance of esti-
mated news will be σ2w = σ2η + σ2ε . However the variance of the forecast,
net of the autoregressive component, Eˆtĝt+1 − ρĝt = αst−q+1 is equal to
ασ2ε . Dividing this variance by the variance of estimated news yields the
misestimated level of α
α˜ ≡ ασ
2
ε
σ2w
≡ α σ
2
ε
σ2η + σ
2
ε
≤ α,
where it can be seen that the lower the relative share of the expected com-
ponent in government expenditure, the smaller the estimated α and the
more relevant the misspecification bias.
Such misspecification, however, should not be troublesome in prac-
tice because Born, Peter, and Pfeifer (2013) show that the quantitative rele-
vance of unexpected shocks to government spending is extremely limited,
while almost all of its variance is due to expected shocks (and thus, α˜ is
very close to the true noise-to-signal ratio).
Multiple noisy news. A different misspecification issue arises in if there are
multiple noisy news. For clarity, we restrict our attention here to the case
of two noisy news, although the argument can be easily made more gen-
eral. Consider the government spending process
gˆt = ρgˆt−1 + ε1,t−1 + ε2,t−2,
where ε1,t−1 and ε2,t−1 have mean zero and variances σ2ε,1 and σ2ε,2, respec-
tively. They are also uncorrelated. Private agents receive a noisy signal
(s1,t, s2,t) for each news shock. The challenge here is to identify five pa-
rameters: ρ, σε,1, σε,2, α1 and α2 (or equivalently, σν,1 and σν,2). However,
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identifying all the parameters is not possible: our limited information ap-
proach has the advantage of being able to identify noisy news without
specifying a whole model, but with the disadvantage that it uses too lit-
tle information to estimate a richer specification of government spending.
Identification can be achieved only if we impose some restrictions on the
noise parameters.9
Also of interest is the case when the true model is composed of two
noisy news shocks but the econometrician attempts to estimate the process
as in (1). Direct computations yield
α˜ = α1ω + α2(1− ω),
where
ω =
σ2ε,1
σ2ε,1 + σ
2
ε,2
is the fraction of the variance of government spending explained by the
news shock ε1,t−1. It appears that our procedure correctly identifies the
true noisy news if ω → 1 (i.e., the news shock ε1,t−1 explains most of the
variance of government spending) and/or α1 ' α2. Conversely, if the
noisy structures are significantly different (α1 6= α2) and the news shock
ε2,t−2 is the main driver (ω → 0), the procedure will correctly identify the
value of α2 but will fail to identify the true number of lags. However,
note that the estimation results in Born, Peter, and Pfeifer (2013) indicate
that among the news shocks, only the news shock with the longest delay
matters, meaning that we can reasonably restrict our analysis to a single
news shock.
Misspecification of the Autoregressive Process. Thus far, we assumed that the
AR(1) process for government spending is the true process. One may won-
der how our estimate of α is affected by a misspecification of the autore-
gressive process. Let us then assume that the true data generating process
(DGP) is an AR(2) process
gˆt = ρ1gˆt−1 + ρ2gˆt−2 + εt−1,
9For example, if we assume the same signal structure for both news processes (σ2ε,1 =
σ2ε,2 = σ
2
ε and σν,1 = σν,2 = σν,), then it is possible to retrieve the model parameters using
our simple method of moments for realizations and expectations.
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where ρ1 +ρ2 < 1, ρ2−ρ1 < 1 and |ρ2| < 1 to satisfy stationarity conditions.
Suppose that we wrongly assume that government spending follows an
AR(1) process. Some tedious calculations10 yield the estimated value of α
in the misspecified AR(1) model under the true DGP
α˜ = µ1 (µ0 + α) ,
where
µ0 =
ρ22
1− ρ22
;
µ1 =
(
1 + ρ2
1− ρ2
)(
1− ρ2
(
1− ρ1 − ρ2
1− ρ2
))(
1− ρ2
(
1 + ρ1 − ρ2
1− ρ2
))
.
The estimated value α˜ is a biased estimate of the true α unless ρ2 6= 0.
When ρ2 → 0, µ0 → 0 and µ1 → 1, the bias tends to zero. There is no
trivial characterization of this bias with respect to ρ1 and ρ2, but we can
consider a simple illustrative example11 that highlights the consequence
of misspecification for the estimation of α. We set ρ1 = 0, and then, ρ2
can vary between −1 and 1. In this case, the estimation of α from the
misspecified AR(1) model is given by
α˜ = ρ22 + (1− ρ22)α.
When ρ2 → ±1, the estimated value tends to one, and thus, we will
incorrectly conclude that there is no noise in government spending policy.
For any value of ρ2 6= 0, the estimation of the misspecified AR(1) model
can yield α˜ > α; thus, we wrongly underestimate the size of the noise.
To address this misspecification issue, in what follows, we model gov-
ernment spending as an AR(1) process. As discussed, such a choice is not
only in line with the literature but also with the evidence at our disposal.
Indeed, if one takes the quarterly detrended log-series of real per capita
government spending in the US (from 1952Q1 to 2014Q1), the AR(1) will
be, among the ARMA(p,q) processes, selected using the Bayesian Informa-
tion and Hannan-Quinn criteria.12 The above evidence is also supported
10See Appendix A.
11See Appendix A.2 for another illustration of misspecification.
12If one were to use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the chosen process would
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by the shape of the partial autocorrelation function, where the strong au-
tocorrelation that emerges at a one-quarter lag suddenly disappears from
two lags on, whereas the same function computed on ∆gt shows that this
latter process has no significant autocorrelation at any lag (see Figure B.9
in Appendix B).
3.3. Recovering quarterly series
Most of the series we address are available at a yearly frequency, while
most of the literature examines quarterly frequency data. Thus, a further
step is needed to convert our annual data into quarterly data. To do so,
once the yearly parameters have been recovered, we make use of an in-
direct inference algorithm (Smith, 1993) to obtain comparable moments
at a quarterly frequency.13 The algorithm essentially generates simulated
quarterly series for actual (with news) and expected (with news and noise)
government spending whose moments, aggregated at a yearly frequency,
yield the the same moments observed in the data. The outcome of the al-
gorithm is a so-called “binding function” that links the α computed at a
yearly frequency with parameters computed at a quarterly frequency. The
function, reported in Figure B.10 in Appendix B, is increasing in both the
autoregressive parameter and in the share of news in the signal. Note,
however, that the higher the value of ρ, the flatter the function becomes in
the value of α at an annual frequency. This implies that in such a case, two
close annual estimates of α may lead to significantly different quarterly
estimates of α.
In what follows, we apply the methodology described above to Canada,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
4. Estimation results
In this section, we identify the relative importance of noise and news
in the data, making use of the official government spending forecasts re-
ported in the annual budgets of Canada, United Kingdom and United
be the ARMA(5,2). The AIC function, however, is very flat for processes with autore-
gressive parameters between 1 and 5. Additionally, the AIC results should be treated
with caution given the well-known fact that this criterion is not consistent (see Lu¨tkepohl
2005).
13Note that if we were to resort to usual temporal disaggregation techniques, we would
obtain smooth time series in which the role of noise is significantly reduced.
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States as the primary data sources. For the US case, we also refer to an-
other source of government spending forecasts, the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF), as a robustness check14. The output of our moments
comparison exercise for these three countries is summarized in Table 1.
Country Annual Quarterly
ρ α ρ α
Canada (Budget) 0.86 0.70 0.95 0.23
(0.016) (0.039) (0.011) (0.010)
UK (Budget) 0.84 0.66 0.94 0.16
(0.017) (0.024) (0.012) (0.007)
US (Budget) 0.85 0.89 0.94 0.72
(0.018) (.045) (0.012) (0.032)
US (SPF) 0.97 0.84 0.99 0.52
(0.009) ( 0.036) (0.007) (0.055)
Table 1: Estimated values of α and ρ at annual and quarterly frequencies.
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000 replications of the residuals are reported in parentheses.
4.1. Canada
For Canada, we collect data from the annual federal budgets from 1968
to 2012. In Canada, the budget - which defines the budget plan for the
next fiscal year (FY) - is usually presented to parliament between January
and June. The FY in Canada starts on April 1st and ends on March, 31st
of the next calendar year. The variable that we track was called “Bud-
getary Expenditures” until 1982. Since 1987, it has been called “Program
Expenditures” (data from 1983 to 1986 are missing and have thus been
interpolated via cubic splines). This broad item includes all government
outlays net of servicing or repayment of debt.15 We complement such se-
ries with their one-year-ahead forecasts, as reported by the government in
its budget.
14See Appendix F for the data sources.
15It would have been desirable to analyze more narrow series for government con-
sumption and investment, but the lack of available data led us to use the above-described
series.
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We divide both series by population and by the GDP implicit price de-
flator and then detrend them with a linear trend. The population series
was first disaggregated at a quarterly frequency using standard disaggre-
gation techniques16 and then aggregated at a FY frequency. The resulting
series of actual expenditures along with the one-year-ahead forecasts are
reported in Figure B.11 in Appendix B.
The estimated process is fairly persistent (ρ = 0.86), while the share of
news in the signal is approximately 70%. When translated into quarterly
frequency, we obtain ρ = 0.95 and α = .23. The dynamics of news and
noise are reported in Figure 1. A reduction in news and noise volatility
is observed during the 90s in conjunction with the start of the so-called
“Great Moderation”, while no significant increase in volatility is recorded
at the time of the global financial crisis. Such a result is consistent with
the narrative that Canada was among the few developed countries not
significantly impacted by the global financial crisis. Thus, no specific fiscal
actions (i.e., neither stimulus nor austerity measures) were implemented
by policymakers due to the crisis.
4.2. United Kingdom
To identify the contribution of news and noise in government spend-
ing for the UK, we use the historical official forecasts database made avail-
able by the Office for Budget Responsibility.17 This database collects the
forecasts made for each year’s budget as presented by the government,
which usually occurs in March for the following FY.18 We focus on fore-
casts for total managed expenditures (TME), which is a broad measure of
total government spending in the UK that includes public sector current
expenditures, public sector net investment and depreciation, transfers and
debt servicing. The forecasts are available for FY 1989-90 to FY 2012-13.
We also collect data on actual TME. This series is available at annual
frequency from FY 1946-47 to FY 2012-13.
We first divide this series by a price index to obtain the variables ex-
pressed in real terms.19 Then, we detrend them by a linear trend and
16We use the “tempdisagg” package in R using the Denton-Cholette disaggregation
method.
17See http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk/data.
18In the UK, the FY starts in April and ends in March of the next calendar year.
19We make use of the GDP deflator from 1955 to 2012, while from 1946 to 1954, we make
16
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Figure 1: Dynamics of news and noise in Canada
Note: This figure plots the estimated dynamics of news and noise in the Canadian data.
compute the autoregressive parameter and the variance. The estimated
autoregressive parameter is 0.84, a value that is very similar (0.94), when
converted to quarterly frequency, to the value obtained for Canada. The
value of α at an annual frequency is estimated to be 0.66, thus implying
a higher share of noise in the signal than in the Canadian data. This im-
plies an even smaller value for α at a quarterly frequency (0.16). It should
be stressed, however, that such a value may also be affected by the short
series available (23 years). This limitation notwithstanding, a reduction in
news and noise can be observed from 2000 to 2009 (see Figure 2), while an
increase in volatility can be observed more recently, possibly related to the
adoption of tighter fiscal policy by the UK government.
use of the long-term indicator of consumer goods and services prices (source: ONS).
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Figure 2: Dynamics of news and noise in the United Kingdom
Note: This figure plots the estimated dynamics of news and noise in the UK data.
4.3. United States
To estimate news and noise in US government spending, we use two
distinct datasets. Our main reference will be the annual federal budgets,
but we also use SPF data, which allows to perform some robustness checks.
4.3.1. Budget data
We first gather data on actual and forecasted “Total Budget Outlays”
extracted from the US federal budgets from 1968 to 2013. The series dis-
plays a degree of persistence broadly in line with that observed for Canada
and the UK (ρ = 0.85 at an annual frequency, ρ = .94 at a quarterly fre-
quency). However, the share of news in the signal the agents receive is
higher than in the previous cases, approximately 0.89 at an annual fre-
quency, which implies α = 0.72 at a quarterly frequency. As can be ob-
served in Figure 3, the volatility of news and noise sharply has increased
in recent years, especially in 2009 (possibly due to the enactment of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), 2010 and 2012.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of news and noise in the US
Note: This figure plots the estimated dynamics of news and noise in US budget data and annualized SPF data.
4.3.2. Survey of Professional Forecasters
We complement the above findings using an alternative source of quar-
terly government spending data, the SPF. The item we focus on is the me-
dian forecast of real federal government consumption expenditures and
gross investment (the variable RFEDGOV). The information structure of
the SPF is as follows. Forecasters are provided with information about the
realization in the preceding quarter; hence, they know gt−1. They receive a
questionnaire at the end of the first month of quarter t, which they submit
by the middle of the second month of period t. It is fair to assume that they
have noisy information about gt, whose preliminary estimate will only be
available in the future, that is, at the end of t. Therefore, we consider fore-
casts of gt that are made in period t to be noisy. In this way, we access
forecasts up to five periods ahead.
As the government spending series in the SPF has been subject to sev-
19
eral revisions, we rebase the series on the NIPA federal government cur-
rent receipts and expenditures series divided by the CPI. Both the actual
series and the forecasts are then detrended by a linear trend. Table 1 re-
ports the results of the estimation procedure. The autoregressive parame-
ter is very persistent and close to 1 (it is .987). The variances of the news
and noise shocks are very close, thus implying that α = 0.52. Compared
to the estimates obtained from budget data, the degree of persistence is
higher, while the share of news in the signal is lower. This suggests that
agents in the economy perceive fiscal policy as being more noisy than it
really is. Overall, the SPF data confirm the robustness of our findings. In
Figure 3, we plot the annualized series of news and noise shocks as iden-
tified using the budget data and the SPF data. The news series is very
similar across these two datasets. For the noise series, notice that they
qualitatively capture the same dynamics, especially during the 80s. Such
a result seems to confirm the robustness of the estimation exercise, taking
into account that the datasets are related to different time series, computed
at different frequencies and over time spans that only partially overlap.
On the rational expectations hypothesis. As an aside, it is worth noting that
implicit in our methodology is an assumption of rational expectations. In
other words, we assume that forecasts are unbiased and efficient.20 To sup-
port this assumption, we checked our dataset to determine whether the
forecast errors (Et−1gt−gt) indeed have a zero mean and whether their dis-
tribution is not skewed or normal. If forecast errors have zero mean, then
the forecasts are, on average, unbiased. The results of these tests are re-
ported in Table D.3 in Appendix D. The hypothesis of a zero mean for the
forecast errors is confirmed across all countries at a 95 percent confidence
interval. The skewness of distribution of the forecast errors is examined
using the D’Agostino skewness test, whose null hypothesis implies that
the data are not skewed. The results of the test confirm that the UK and
US data do not display a significant degree of skewness, whereas the null
20We are aware of potential issues related to bias in both forecasts and data revisions,
but we decided to rely on the assumption of rational expectations for two reasons. First,
we deem the costs of departing from this hypothesis (in terms of both the number of
degrees of freedom for the underlying assumptions and the complexity of the empirical
approach) to outweigh the benefits. Second, as discussed next in the text, our dataset
seems to satisfy, overall, the rational expectations hypothesis, which is in line with the
findings of Pesaran and Weale (2006).
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hypothesis for Canada is rejected.21 The normality test performed via the
Jarque-Bera test, indicates that the forecast errors computed on UK and US
budget data are normally distributed, while the errors for Canadian bud-
get data and US SPF data are not. Overall, these findings suggest that the
distribution of forecast errors is centered at zero and not skewed. There-
fore, at a minimum, they imply that the rational expectations hypothesis
cannot be discarded.
4.3.3. Robustness checks using SPF data
The quarterly frequency of the SPF data allows us to perform further
robustness checks on the possible endogeneity of noise. Indeed, one may
claim that what we have labeled “noise” so far could be mere model mis-
specification that arises from ignoring the endogenous response of fiscal
policy to macro variables. Therefore, we assume that the government
spending rule is of the kind
gt = ρgt−1 + γXt + εt−q, (5)
where Xt is a measure of economic activity such as real per capita GDP (in
log-deviation from a linear trend) or the level of detrended TFP.22. Alter-
natively, Xt may be a dummy for NBER recession dates or for the political
party in power during period t. The former aims to control for structural
differences in the path of government spending during recessions, while
the latter aims to control for different political spending styles. To estimate
news and noise in such a model, we need to observe EˆtXt+1. To maintain
tractability, we use the realization of Xt+1 (thus assuming perfect foresight
of this variable).
We then estimate both OLS regressions and IV regressions (using the
one-period lag of Xt as the instrumental variable) for equation (5) and
21More precisely, the forecast errors for Canada display negative skewness, thus indi-
cating that realizations of government spending tend to outperform forecasts – although,
on average, the forecast error is zero. However, a close inspection of the Canadian time
series reveals that the skewness is due to two data points (related to the years 1974 and
1975). If one removes these two points from the series, the null hypothesis for skewness
is confirmed.
22The source for this GDP data is the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, while for TFP,
the source is the Federal Reserve of San Francisco (see http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tfp/)
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report the results in Table 2. In all these cases, we obtain a level of noise
that is similar to the process without an endogenous component. These
findings thus confirm that the source of noise in the data is outside the
model.
Endogenous GDP TFP NBER Democrat
component recessions Republican
OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS
ρ 0.9862 0.9858 0.9856 0.9856 0.9859 0.9860
( 0.0095) 0.0095) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0095) ( 0.0095)
γ 0.1084 -0.0569 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0039 0.0008
(0.0748) (0.0831) ( 0.000) (0.0002) (0.0035) ( 0.0056)
α 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.53
(0.0463) (0.0563) (0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0505) (0.0543)
Table 2: Estimates of α with endogenous components in the spending rule.
Note: In the IV regressions, we use lagged realizations of Xt as instruments. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Standard errors for the α parameter are obtained through a bootstrapping procedure based on
1000 replications of the residuals.
To check the goodness of fit of our approach, we also simulated data
(see Table D.4 in Appendix D). More precisely, we modified our DSGE
model by introducing an endogenous government spending rule as in (5)
with the log of detrended GDP on the right-hand side. The parameters
were calibrated on the IV regression with GDP.23 We then generated simu-
lated data for 1000 periods from the model assuming that news and noise
shocks were the only sources of economic fluctuation and estimated the
regressions using these simulated data to determine whether the true pa-
rameters could be recovered. The results reported in Table D.4 show that
the values of the parameters estimated via an IV approach are close to the
values of the true parameters. Interestingly, given that the feedback coef-
ficient is found to be non-significant in the IV regression, a simple AR(1)
estimation would be able to generate values for ρ and α that are very close
to the true values.
23Therefore, the parameters were set as follows: ρ = 0.9858, γ = −0.0569 and α = 0.54.
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5. Quantitative results from the DSGE model
The model is log-linearized around the non-stochastic steady state and
solved using standard methods. The values of the parameters, which are
reported in Appendix C, are taken from Mertens and Ravn (2011) and
Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe´, and Uribe (2012), with the notable exception
of the parameters related to government spending and information flows.
Although the parameters in the original Mertens and Ravn (2011) paper
were estimated using US data, we apply the same calibration to the UK
and Canada to compare their output with that of the US model. Further-
more, to make the results comparable across countries, and because the
augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests do not reject the unit
root hypothesis, we conduct simulations for these countries setting the
autoregressive parameter of government spending equal to 1. Note, how-
ever, than none of our qualitative results is due to the fact that we assume
that ρ = 1 in the government spending process. The quantitative results
do not change significantly as long as the government spending process
displays enough persistence.24 Lastly, for comparability we set q = 4 for
all countries, a fairly conservative value in line with the literature on fis-
cal news (Born et al. 2013,Leeper et al. 2013, Mertens and Ravn 2011 and
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2012).
5.1. Inspecting the mechanism
Before comparing the outcomes of the model under the estimated val-
ues of α, Figure 4 plots the IRFs for output, non-durables, durable goods
and investment reactions to a news and a noise shock in a fictitious case
wherein the amount of noise is equivalent to the amount of news (i.e.,
α = .5). Note that output jumps up in period 4 only if the announced in-
crease in government spending actually takes place; if the announcement
turns out to be pure noise it means that no actual spending occurs. As
expected, the shapes of the IRFs are the same for noise and news until
the shock actually occurs. This similarity is due to the fact that agents in
this economy are not able to identify the source of the variation in the sig-
nal. An important corollary is that choice variables also react to a noise
shock until the news event is realized. Moreover, noise shocks affect real
24For a discussion of the macroeconomic role of government spending persistence, see
Dupaigne and Fe`ve (2015).
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variables even after their non-fundamental nature is revealed. In other
words, when an announcement is at least partially noisy (i.e., α > 0), an
announced increase in government spending is able to generate a positive
response of output even if the positive signal is due entirely to noise.
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Figure 4: IRFs for output, consumption, durable goods and investment to a noise and a
news shock
Note: This figure plots the IRFs for output, non-durables consumption, durable goods consumption and in-
vestment (as percentages) to a 1 percent shock to government spending under a mild level of noise (α = 0.5).
The long-lasting effect of noise can be gauged by performing a vari-
ance decomposition of news and noise shocks at different horizons for the
above variables. These results are plotted in Figure 5. Noise still explains
approximately 20 percent of the investment variance after 10 periods while
the percentage is a bit lower for consumption of both non-durable and
24
durable goods. The variance of output is much less affected by noise after
that noise is revealed. This pattern is due to the fact that output is the sum
of consumption, durables, investment and government spending, and this
latter variable (which exhibits no variance before period 5) is not affected
by noise.
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Figure 5: Conditional variance decomposition of news and noise shocks at different hori-
zons
Note: This figure plots the conditional variance decomposition of news and noise shocks at different horizons
for output, consumption of non-durables, consumption of durable goods and investment under a mild level of
noise (α = 0.5).
5.2. Quantifying the effect of noisy news
We investigate the quantitative impact of noise by comparing the IRFs
for a news shock under different assumptions about the information flow.
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More precisely, we compare the outcome of an economy under perfect in-
formation about government spending (α = 1) to one under the parametriza-
tion implied by the estimated noise to signal ratio in Table 1. For the value
of α in the US, we rely on budget data for consistency with the UK and
Canada datasets, which are also based on budget data. The results of this
exercise are reported in Figure 6.
Note that the main role played by noise is to mitigate the dynamics of
the variables. Additionally, due to real rigidities, even after the shock is
realized, agents’ reactions tend to lag behind the reaction observed under
perfect information. Comparing the outcomes under partial information,
the response of the UK and Canada are similar, while as expected, the
reaction of the US is closer to the full information benchmark.
In Figure 6, the variable that reacts the most is investment. This re-
sult is much in line with the view of news shocks as an inducer of “animal
spirits” (see Beaudry and Portier 2014) and is related to the fact that invest-
ment is a forward-looking variable mainly because it cannot immediately
adjust to external shocks. However, the presence of noise dampens the
adjustment of investment. As for consumption and durable goods, invest-
ment under-reacts until the uncertainty is resolved (in period 5), and then,
a phase of gradual catch-up to the perfect information case occurs.
We now address the issue of quantifying the impact of noise on some
measures of fiscal multipliers. First, note that over the long run, the econ-
omy is not affected by imperfect information: the long-run multiplier for
output, defined as the relative variation in the steady states of output and
government spending after a persistent government spending shock, is
equal to 1.35, irrespective of the severity of the information issue because
when the news shock is realized, agents will be able to infer it from the
dynamics of government spending and will thus gradually adjust their
choices. Over the short to medium run, however, the picture can substan-
tially change due to the frictions generated by imperfect information.
To quantify the impact of information frictions on the transmission of
fiscal policy shocks, we compute two measures of the government spend-
ing multipliers for output, consumption and investment.25 The first one is
25Multipliers for durable goods are reported in Appendix B.
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Figure 6: IRFs for a news shock
Note: This figure plots the IRFs for output, non-durable consumption, durable goods consumption and invest-
ment (as percentages) reactions to a 1 percent shock in government spending under the assumption of perfect
information (α = 1) vs the estimated level of noise for Canada, the UK and the US.
computed as
GSMt =
X̂t
ĝq
X
G
for t = 1, ..., T , where Xt is alternatively output, consumption or in-
vestment, while X and G denote the steady state values, and variables
with a hat are log-deviations from the steady state.
The second measure is the net present value of the multiplier (Mount-
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ford and Uhlig, 2009), which is computed according to the formula
NPVt =
∑k
j=0 β
jX̂t+j∑k
j=0 β
j ĝt+j+q
X
G
.
Note that in the first case, the denominator is lagged forward as the
news shock occurs in period t + q. In the upper panels of Figure 7, the
values of GSMt and NPVt for output are reported for the three economies
considered along with the full information benchmark.
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Figure 7: Output multipliers and deviation from the full information multipliers
Note: This figure plots the multipliers for output and the deviation (as a percentage) under partial information
compared to the full information case. The figures in the bottom panel are computed as X
i
t−XFIt
XFI
t
, where X is
alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM, and i = CA,UK,US.
In both cases, the values of the multipliers under partial information
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are consistently lower than in the case of perfect information. To gain
a quantitative insight into the loss for each economy due to information
frictions, we compute the distance in percentage terms of the multiplier
for each economy from the corresponding full information multiplier. The
results are reported in the lower panels of the figure and expressed in per-
centage terms. Note that if one considers the GSM , the losses for the UK
and Canada are well above 80% until the news is realized. In fact, the loss
from the full information multiplier is exactly equal to 1−α and is not de-
pendent on the value of the parameters or on the frictions in the model.26
After the realization of the news shock, the loss falls to approximately 15
percent or less, while the multiplier gradually converges to its long-run
value. The loss for the US is less severe on impact (28 percent), but still
notable.
If we consider the multipliers for consumption and investment (Fig-
ure 8), we note that the negative effect on consumption is fairly small (up
to -0.15 over the long run). The effect on investment, however, is signifi-
cant. The potential of investment is dampened by noise: the investment
multiplier soon after the shock is realized (period 5) is approximately 0.4
under full information. This value drops significantly to 0.2 or less in all
three cases when imperfect information is considered. In contrast to the
multiplier on output, such a multiplier loss is not rapidly recovered after
the realization of the shock. For example, in period 10, both consumption
and investment multipliers in noisy environments are still approximately
20 percent less than the level one would have observed under full infor-
mation.
26We also performed the above exercises using alternative specifications of the model
(results available upon request). More precisely, we removed durable goods and intro-
duced nominal frictions in the form of Calvo pricing to a model a` la Smets and Wouters.
All of the above results hold, and for a reasonable calibration of the parameters related
to price stickiness and monetary policy reaction, we quantitatively obtain very similar
values for multipliers from period 5 on.
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Figure 8: Consumption and investment multipliers and deviation from full information
multipliers
Note: This figure plots the multipliers for consumption and investment and the deviation under partial infor-
mation compared to the full information case. The figures in the bottom panel are computed as X
i
t−XFIt
XFI
t
where
X is alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM and i = CA,UK,US.
6. Conclusion
The role of imperfect information in business cycles is one of the most
promising research paths recently explored in macroeconomics. In this
paper, we highlighted the relationship between imperfect or “noisy” in-
formation and the conduct of fiscal policy.
Using official forecasts of government spending as reported in the an-
nual budgets of Canada, the UK and the US, we demonstrated the im-
plementation of a limited information approach (a simple method of mo-
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ments) to identify news and noise. The amount of noise observed for these
three countries is significant: on average, the percentage of noise in offi-
cial government spending forecasts ranges from 28% to 84%. Using these
values in a richer DSGE setting, we highlighted the detrimental effects on
fiscal multipliers, particularly on investment multipliers.
Our approach can be fruitfully extended to other policy settings in
which announcements play crucial roles, such as monetary policy (for-
ward guidance) or banking regulations and structural reforms implemented
with lags.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Further results on misspecification
Appendix A.1. Estimation of α˜
The true data generating process (DGP) is an AR(2) process
gˆt = ρ1gˆt−1 + ρ2gˆt−2 + εt−1
and the misspecified AR(1) model is written
gˆt = ρgˆt−1 + ε˜t−1
Under the AR(2), we first estimate the parameter ρ in the AR(1) model.
From the first order autocorrelation of an AR(2) process (see Hamilton
1994b), we deduce
ρ =
ρ1
1− ρ2
To obtain an estimate of α in the misspecified AR(1) model, we linearly
project Etgˆt+1 − ρgˆt on gˆt+1 − ρgˆt. We deduce
α˜ =
Cov (Etgˆt+1 − ρgˆt, gˆt+1 − ρgˆt)
V (gˆt+1 − ρgˆt)
=
Cov ((ρ1 − ρ)gˆt + ρ2gˆt−1 + α(εt + νt), (ρ1 − ρ)gˆt + ρ2gˆt−1 + εt)
V ((ρ1 − ρ)gˆt + ρ2gˆt−1 + εt)
=
((ρ1 − ρ)2 + ρ22)V (gˆt) + 2(ρ1 − ρ)ρ2Cov(gˆt, gˆt−1) + ασ2ε
V ((ρ1 − ρ)gˆt + ρ2gˆt−1 + εt)
=
(
ρ21ρ
2
2
(1−ρ2)2 + ρ
2
2
)
V (gˆt)− 2 ρ1ρ
2
2
1−ρ2Cov(gˆt, gˆt−1) + ασ
2
ε
V ((ρ1 − ρ)gˆt + ρ2gˆt−1 + εt)
Using the autocovariances (at orders 0 and 1), we deduce
V (gˆt) =
(1− ρ2)σ2ε
(1 + ρ2)((1− ρ2)2 − ρ21)
Cov(gˆt, gˆt−1) =
ρ1
1− ρ2
(1− ρ2)σ2ε
(1 + ρ2)((1− ρ2)2 − ρ21)
V ((ρ1 − ρ)gˆt + ρ2gˆt−1 + εt) = (1− ρ2)σ
2
ε
(1 + ρ2)
(
(1− ρ2)2 − ρ
2
1ρ
2
2
(1−ρ2)2
)
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After replacement into α˜, we deduce
α˜ =
(
ρ21ρ
2
2
(1−ρ2)2 + ρ
2
2
)
(1−ρ2)σ2ε
(1+ρ2)((1−ρ2)2−ρ21) − 2
ρ21ρ
2
2
(1−ρ2)2
(1−ρ2)σ2ε
(1+ρ2)((1−ρ2)2−ρ21) + ασ
2
ε
(1−ρ2)σ2ε
(1+ρ2)
(
(1−ρ2)2−
ρ2
1
ρ2
2
(1−ρ2)2
)
=
(
ρ21ρ
2
2
(1−ρ2)2 + ρ
2
2
)
(1−ρ2)
(1+ρ2)((1−ρ2)2−ρ21) − 2
ρ21ρ
2
2
(1−ρ2)2
(1−ρ2)
(1+ρ2)((1−ρ2)2−ρ21) + α
(1−ρ2)
(1+ρ2)
(
(1−ρ2)2−
ρ2
1
ρ2
2
(1−ρ2)2
)
=
ρ22
1−ρ22 + α
(1−ρ2)
(1+ρ2)
(
(1−ρ2)2−
ρ2
1
ρ2
2
(1−ρ2)2
)
=
ρ22
1− ρ22
1 + ρ2
1− ρ2
(
(1− ρ2)2 − ρ
2
1ρ
2
2
(1− ρ2)2
)
+
1 + ρ2
1− ρ2
(
(1− ρ2)2 − ρ
2
1ρ
2
2
(1− ρ2)2
)
α
=
(
ρ22
1− ρ22
)(
1 + ρ2
1− ρ2
)(
1− ρ2
(
1− ρ1− ρ2
1− ρ2
))(
1− ρ2
(
1 + ρ1− ρ2
1− ρ2
))
+
(
1 + ρ2
1− ρ2
)(
1− ρ2
(
1− ρ1− ρ2
1− ρ2
))(
1− ρ2
(
1 + ρ1− ρ2
1− ρ2
))
α
Appendix A.2. A simple illustration of misspecification
Let us assume that the true data generating process (DGP) is an AR(1),
but we wrongly assume that government spending does not display serial
correlation. To obtain an estimate of α in the misspecified AR(1) model, we
linearly project Etgˆt+1 on gˆt+1 and use the true stochastic process of gov-
ernment spending. The estimated value for α in the misspecified model
under the true DGP is given by
α˜ = ρ+ α(1− ρ2)
Assume that ρ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., government spending can display serial corre-
lation. This implies that α˜ ≥ α, so we will underestimate the size of the
noise. For example, if ρ → 1, the estimated value tends to one. Thus, we
will incorrectly conclude that there is no noise in government spending
policy.
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Appendix B. Additional graphs
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Figure B.9: Partial autocorrelation of government spending in the US
Note: In this figure, the autocorrelation functions for the quarterly log-series of real per capita government
spending in the US (linearly detrended from 1952Q1 to 2014Q1, left panel) and for its first difference (∆gt, right
panel) are plotted. Confidence intervals are at 95% level. Series: “Real Government Consumption Expenditures
and Gross Investment” (id: GCEC96), source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; “Total Population: All Ages
including Armed Forces Overseas”, source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau.
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Figure B.10: The binding function
Note: This figure plots the binding function that yields the share of news at a yearly frequency (αa) as a function
of the share of news and the autoregressive parameter of the quarterly series (αb and ρ).
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Figure B.11: Log of detrended per capita real government spending in Canada
Note: This figure plots actual realizations and one-step-ahead forecasts of the log of detrended per capita real
government spending in Canada.
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Figure B.12: Log of detrended per capita real government spending in the UK
Note: This figure plots realizations and one step ahead forecasts of the log of detrended per capita real govern-
ment spending in the United Kingdom.
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Figure B.13: Log of detrended per capita real government spending in the US
Note: This figure plots realizations and one-step-ahead forecasts of the log of detrended per capita real govern-
ment spending in the United States.
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Appendix C. Calibrated values
Parameter Value Description
γz 1.005 Trend
θ .36 Capital share
Y 1 Steady state output
G
Y
0.201 Share of government spending
ν 1 Capital utilization at steady state
N .25 Labor at steady state
C
D
7.4034 Consumption to durables
σ 3.7621 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
b 0.8804 Habit formation
β 0.9742 Discount factor
κ 0.9759 Disutility of labor
ωi 8.488 Adjustment cost for investment
ωd 7.795 Adjustment cost for durables
ρg 1 Persistence of government spending shock
σg .0548 Std dev of government spending shock
Note: The values of the parameters are taken from Mertens and Ravn (2011), except for the parameters related
to the government spending process (ρg and σg).
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Appendix D. Additional tables
Country t-test D’Agostino Jarque-Bera
(µ = 0) skewness test test
Canada -0.0073 Skew=-1.8754 χ22= 144.6786
[-0.0283; 0.0137] (0.0050) ( 0.0000)
UK 0.0014 Skew=0.1623 χ22=0.6364
[-0.0026; 0.0054] (0.804) (0.7274)
US (Budget) -0.0125 Skew = -0.2756 χ22=0.5967
[-0.0248; -0.0002] (0.5802) (0.7421)
US (SPF) -0.0016 Skew=-0.1480 χ22=36.6799
[ -0.0043; 0.0011] (0.6335) (0.0000)
Table D.3: Zero mean, skewness and normality tests on forecast errors.
In the t-test column, the lower and upper bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals are reported in brackets.
The D’Agostino skewness test and Jarque-Bera test p-values are reported in parentheses. The null hypothesis
for the D’Agostino skewness test is that data have no skewness. The null hypothesis for the Jarque-Bera test is
that data are normally distributed.
True parameters AR(1) IV
ρ 0.9858 0.9779 0.9786
( 0.0064) ( 0.0064)
γ -0.0569 -0.1047
( 0.1727)
α 0.54 0.55 0.55
(0.0243) (0.0248)
Table D.4: Estimates of simulated data with endogenous components in the spending
rule.
Note: In the IV regression we use the lagged realizations of GDP as the instrument. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Standard errors for the α parameter are obtained through a bootstrapping procedure based on
1000 replications of the residuals.
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Appendix E. Durable goods multipliers and NPV GSM for consump-
tion and investment
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Figure E.14: Durable goods multiplier and deviation from full information
Note: This figure plots the multipliers for durable goods and the deviation under partial information compared
to the full information case. The figures in the bottom panel are computed as X
i
t−XFIt
XFI
t
whereX is alternatively
the GSM and the NPV of the GSM and i = CA,UK,US.
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Figure E.15: NPV multipliers of consumption and investment and deviation from full
information
Note: This figure plots the NPV multipliers for consumption and investment and the deviation under partial
information compared to the full information case. The figures in the bottom panel are computed as X
i
t−XFIt
XFI
t
where X is alternatively the GSM and the NPV of the GSM and i = CA,UK,US.
Appendix F. Data sources
Appendix F.1. Canada
The following are the series for Canada:
• Government Spending: “Budget Expenditures” (up to 1982) and “Pro-
gram Expenses” (from 1987). Source: Budget Speech and Budget
Plan, various years.
• Population: “Total population”. Source: World Bank (series id: SP.POP.TOTL)
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• Price deflator: “GDP Implicit Price Deflator”. Source: OECD.
Appendix F.2. United Kingdom
The following are the series for the UK:
• Government Spending: “Total managed expenditure”. Source: UK
Budget, various years.
• Population: “Mid-year population estimates”. Source: ONS.
• Price deflator: “GDP Implicit Price Deflator”. Source: OECD.
Appendix F.3. United States
The following are the series for the US:
• Government Spending (Budget): “Total budget outlays”. Source:
Federal Budget, various years.
• Government Spending (SPF): “Real Federal Government Consump-
tion Expenditures and Gross Investment”. Source: Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters (series id: RFEDGOV).
• Population: “Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces
Overseas”. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau.
• Price deflator: “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All
Items”. Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics.
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